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insight, one that can used later to build even more extensive studies of 
ISIS and its impact on contemporary West Asian politics.  
JANUS ISAAC V. NOLASCO
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The decisive collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a euphoric discourse 
over a simple, yet profoundly consequential question: “So what now?” 
After almost a century of cataclysms—beginning with the First World 
War, which upended the relatively peaceful, post-Napoleonic order 
in Europe—there was now a genuine hope for lasting peace. Yet, the 
sheer weight of history, especially the violent and devastating nature of 
the 20th century, beckoned a more fundamental philosophical inquiry 
into the essence of the post-Cold War age and how it would look like.
Among progressive circles, the demise of Stalinist regimes served 
as a double-edged sword. The evisceration of what many saw as the 
perversion of Communism provided a unique opportunity to espouse 
a more benign, democratic, and enlightened version of Marxism on 
a universal scale. Finally, Marxism would escape the grip of “oriental 
despotism.” 
At the same time, there was now less pressure on Western 
governments to ameliorate the excesses of capitalism. After all, as 
Margaret Thatcher—the “Iron Lady” who emasculated the European 
welfare state—brutally put it: There is no (ideological) alternative. 
Even social democrats had to recalibrate the coordinates of their social 
agenda on conservatives’ terms, giving birth to Blairite “Third Way,” 
which was essentially social democracy along neo-liberal lines—a 
hollow, if not toxic, cocktail that appalled many progressives. 
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The liberals and conservatives, however, were a bit more 
triumphalist. In The Revenge of Geography (2012), Robert Kaplan 
provides an eloquent account of the naiveté of many liberal thinkers, 
who (mistakenly) presumed that the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
represented an irreversible victory, both moral and strategic, for the 
West. For them, the end of Cold War didn’t only mark the defeat of a 
dangerous adversary, but also a Voltairean triumph of human agency 
over the impersonal forces of history, including geography.  
While Oxford University’s Timothy Garton Ash expressed 
tremendous hope vis-à-vis the emergence of a truly free and democratic 
post-Soviet space, and perhaps even beyond, liberal hawks like Leon 
Wieseltier, literary editor of The New Republic, went so far as espousing 
regime change and Western intervention across global peripheries—
not only to prevent mass atrocities, but to also universalize the march 
of democracy that swept Central-Eastern Europe (Mitteleuropa). 
Yet, one could argue that the most influential thinkers of the post-
Cold War were the conservatives, particularly two American thinkers: 
Francis Fukuyama and, his mentor in Harvard, Samuel Huntington. 
Giving a new twist to an old trick, Fukuyama—a policy-maker at the 
U.S. State Department and expert at Rand Corporation—leveraged 
his deep familiarity with political philosophy (graduate studies) and 
classics (undergraduate studies) to provide a new framework for 
understanding the historical significance and broader philosophical 
implications of the end of Cold War. 
Beginning with an essay for The National Interest, which was later 
on expanded into a full-blown book The End of History and the Last 
Man (1992), Fukuyama combined Plato’s concept of thymos (pride) 
and Hegelian dialectics (via Kojève) to conclude, quite controversially, 
that the grand trans-historical debate on what constitutes the ideal 
form of social organization had finally come to close, with capitalist 
democracy indubitably coming on top. 
Obviously, he wasn’t counting out the possibility that many 
countries, outside the West, would never fully establish vibrant liberal 
democracies, with others, particularly the fundamentalists, even 
rejecting the tenets of modernity and enlightenment altogether. In his 
latest book, Political Order and Political Decay (2014), he reiterated his 
skepticism vis-à-vis the universal applicability of capitalist democracy, 
but extolled its virtues on an ideal (Hegelian) level and traction across 
civilizations (think of the Arab Spring or the Occupy Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese Sunflower movements).
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Soon, however, Fukuyama’s mentor stepped in, expanding an essay 
in Foreign Affairs into a full-blown book, The Clash of Civilizations 
(1996). While the title of his original essay, as Edward Said cleverly 
points out, (humbly) ended with a question mark, the book projected 
absolute certainty in both its title and content. Huntington’s work 
proved to be more popular with the military-industrial complex, 
which—grappling with post-Cold War “peace dividends”—was 
eagerly in search of new monsters to slay. 
Unlike Fukuyama, who expressed reservations with the spiritual 
poverty of Western societies (hence, the Nietzschean “last man” in the 
title), his mentor expressed certainty (akin to liberals) about the moral 
ascendancy of the West—and its supposed obligation to make the 
world safe for (Americanized) globalization. The “clash of civilizations” 
thesis was less an analysis of real, existing socio-religious fault-lines 
than a call for Western vigilance against a rising China in East 
Asia and, more immediately, anti-American forces—from religious 
fundamentalists to revisionist powers in Iraq and Iran—in the Middle 
East. The book was a geopolitical (rather than scholarly) blockbuster, 
energizing the neo-conservative wing of American foreign policy 
establishment, which played a critical role in the subsequent disasters 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Neglecting Freud’s geopolitically poignant concept of “narcissism 
of small differences,” Huntington curiously ignored deep ethnic-
sectarian fissures within the civilizations, as evident in the almost 
decade-long war between (Persian-Shia) Iran and (Arab-Sunni) Iraq 
in the 1980s, not to mention the millennium-old rivalry between 
Confucian-Communist China and Vietnam, which culminated in 
maritime skirmishes and a major continental war towards the end of 
Cold War. But the attraction of his thesis wasn’t dampened by real 
world events. It was simply too tempting not only for sanctimonious 
conservatives and liberals in the West, but also the media-industrial-
military complex, which was itching for a new “other” to fight against. 
THE CLASH WITHIN CIVILIZATIONS 
A cursory look at the Middle East and East Asia in the 21st century 
reveals the widening fault-lines within the Islamic and Confucian 
civilizations. In the Middle East, the emergence of the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (“Daish” in Arabic) has coincided with an intensified 
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sectarian warfare in the region, which has curiously brought together 
two historical rivals: The United States and Shia powerhouse Iran. 
Confronting a common enemy in Sunni extremism, Washington 
(under the Obama administration) and Tehran (under the Rouhani 
administration) have found enough strategic incentive to strike 
a long-elusive comprehensive nuclear agreement after two years 
of non-stop negotiations—a historic deal that is expected to only 
strengthen and expand existing tactical cooperation between the two 
powers across the region, especially as “Daish” and al-Qaeda affiliate 
groups extend their tentacles from Morocco to Mindanao. 
In fact, there are growing indications that the Iranian 
establishment is increasingly viewing Sunni powerhouse Saudi 
Arabia—widely seen as the source and patron of Wahhabism, a 
puritanical sect, which has provided the ideological underpinnings of 
today’s Sunni extremism—rather than the United States and United 
Kingdom as its true ideological foe. 
The real threat to post-Cold War Western hegemony, however, 
comes from no less than China, which has both the heft and (arguably 
the) ambition to create a Sino-centric order in East Asia—the new 
pivot of history. No other revisionist power, not even Russia, comes 
even close. China’s economy, soon to be the biggest in the world 
in nominal terms, is feeding its massive military modernization 
program, which is anchored by the world’s second largest military 
budget. 
As Martin Jacques, in When China Rules the World (2009), notes: 
China is no Soviet monolith. It boasts a vibrant economy, relishes a 
dynamic technological-scientific base and a massive pool of skilled 
labor, and has a long history of successful and relatively benign 
imperial past, which it could draw on. Though China’s turbocharged 
economic growth is expected to gradually slowdown in the near 
future, it will still feature as a gigantic, upper-middle-income country 
with vast resources and a teeming population. 
Towering above leading scholars, legendary (and highly 
controversial) diplomat Henry Kissinger has devoted recent years to 
analyzing the rise of China, its strategic calculus, and the prospects 
of a post-American world. His 2011 book, On China, provides a 
valuable account of his direct experience of negotiating with Maoist 
China at the height of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which paved the way 
for a tactical Sino-American strategic partnership. It is a masterpiece 
and succinct endorsement of Realpolitk. 
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In the book, Kissinger forwards two major insights. First, 
Chairman Mao, who feverishly fought against the last vestiges of 
Chinese feudalism (the essence of the Cultural Revolution), was 
heavily influenced by China’s ancient strategic thinking, which was 
anchored by a vast literature going back to the Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States periods that ended with the victory of the Qin dynasty 
in 221 B.C. Related to the first insight, Kissinger also highlighted 
the importance of the concept of “Shi” (alignment of forces) and 
psychological warfare to Communist China’s strategic calculus. 
In his latest book, World Order, Kissinger talks about the two 
pillars of an existing order, which pertains to a set of mutually-accepted 
rules that govern the behavior of states within a specific geographical 
location. One is legitimacy and the other is balance of power. As far 
as the Asian order is concerned, it is suffering both from a legitimacy 
crisis (at least from China’s point of view) and a seismic power shift, 
mainly in favor of China, but to a lesser degree also the likes of India 
and Indonesia. 
THE NEW BATTLEFIELD
In Charm Offensive (2007), Joshua Kurlantizk provides a comprehensive 
account of the highly successful nature of China’s diplomatic outreach 
during the Jiang Zemin and early-Hu Jintao administrations. From 
the mid-1990s (after the demise of Deng Xiaoping) to the mid-2000s, 
China was able to lure its neighbors, thanks to a savvy deployment of 
economic incentives without specific policy preconditions, giving birth 
to what Joshua Cooper-Ramo described as the “Beijing Consensus.”
It didn’t take long, however, before China fell into its own moment 
of triumphalism. Shortly after the 2008 Great Recession, which severely 
undermined the economic foundations of American power, China 
began to flex its muscle, more aggressively asserting its territorial claims 
in adjacent waters. Perhaps, Beijing saw a shift in the “Shi,” grasping 
a new strategic opening. It no longer had to bide its time and hide its 
ambitions, as ancient Chinese thinking advised the revisionist powers. 
Akin to the United States’ 19th-century Mahanian strategy of 
dominating the Caribbean as its exclusive zone of influence, China was 
now seeking its own strategic depth across adjacent waters, namely the 
South and East China Seas. So it was combining both the insights of 
Sun Tzu and Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
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As the balance of power rapidly shifted in China’s favor—thanks 
to its robust economic growth and accelerated military modernization 
program amid American recession and shrinking military budget—the 
Asian powerhouse also began to launch a doctrinal challenge, which 
essentially challenged modern international law and the American-led 
liberal international order. 
In The South China Sea, Bill Hayton provides arguably the best 
analysis yet of China’s so-called “Nine-Dashed-Line” claims, which 
are based on so-called “historical rights” doctrine of Beijing. As 
Hayton cogently explains, there is hardly anything historical or right 
with China’s claims in the area. 
The Nine-Dashed-Line (formally announced in 2009, after 
Malaysia and Vietnam effectively internationalized the disputes by 
taking their claims to the United Nations) was mainly a modern 
Chinese construct, a kneejerk (and ill-informed) nationalist reaction 
amid the violent collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 20th 
century—followed by decades of warlordism and brutal Japanese 
occupation that only ended after a vicious civil war between nationalist 
and communist forces. 
As far as modern international law is concerned, China’s sweeping 
territorial claims, which embraces much of the South China Sea like 
a domestic lake, not only violates the rights of other littoral states 
(particularly within their 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic 
Zone), but also freedom of navigation in international waters. As 
Rober Kaplan, in Asia’s Cauldron, explains, China’s growing maritime 
assertiveness has imperiled a decades-long period of stability and 
prosperity in Asia, provoking the emergence of a string of informal 
alliances on China’s peripheries. 
In a direct rebuke of Huntington’s thesis, Kaplan shows how even 
Vietnam has put aside its historical animosities with Washington in 
order to push back against its fellow Confucian northern neighbor. 
Perturbed over the possibility of a Chinese-dominated Western 
Pacific, the United States—under the so-called Pivot to Asia (P2A) 
policy—has come to the rescue of its allies ( Japan and the Philippines), 
explored new alliances with India and Vietnam, expanded rotational 
military presence in Malaysia and Singapore, and has launched a free 
trading deal (Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement), which is aimed at 
countering China’s economic preponderance in East Asia. 
Confronting Chinese revanchist maneuvers in the East China 
Sea, post-war Japan—an insular island, which was deeply influenced 
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by Chinese civilization throughout centuries—has also gradually 
revisited its pacifist foreign policy, with the nationalist Shinzo Abe 
administration pushing for a more pro-active projection of the 
Northeast Asian country’s (half-concealed) military muscle in concert 
with a “diamond of democracies,” composed of the United States, 
Australia, India, and increasingly the Philippines. 
The problem, however, is that the United States no longer has the 
kind of military wherewithal to fully constrain China’s ambitions. As a 
result, Kaplan implicitly suggests that a Sino-American co-dominion 
is perhaps inevitable in the region, giving birth to what can be called 
as “Pax Chimerica.” The term “Chimerica” was actually first coined 
by historian Niall Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularick, who 
explored the deep state of economic co-dependence and symbiosis 
between the two superpowers. After all, China needs American 
technology and markets as much as America needs Chinese credit and 
cheap labor, not to mention their entwined currencies. 
The problem with much of the contemporary international 
relations scholarship and punditry, however, is the tendency to ignore 
domestic sources of foreign policy. Among all contemporary writers, 
Evan Osnos (currently with the New Yorker magazine) arguably 
provides the most sober and accurate account of the domestic sources 
of China’s international ambitions. 
In Age of Ambition, Osnos de-Orientalizes China, dispensing with 
Halford Mackinder’s prejudicial “yellow peril” commentaries, in favor 
of a levelheaded understanding of the complex domestic forces—
unleashed by capitalist expansion, demise of communism as an 
ideology, and a fraught but blossoming relationship with the ancient 
(Confucian) past—that are driving modern China. Similar to the 
United States in the late 19th century, China is gripped by a zeitgeist 
of ambition, both on the personal and collective levels. 
Osnos provides a nuanced understanding of the concept of “China 
Dream,” which is the reigning slogan of the Xi Jinping administration. 
He shows how the rise of popular nationalism and the growing 
influence of the military—thanks to the Patriotic Education program 
that was introduced after the demise of the Soviet Union—has served 
as a major impetus for greater assertion of China’s historical claims in 
adjacent waters. 
Unwilling to democratize the Chinese political system, and still 
insecure with his grip on power amid a precarious anti-corruption 
crackdown and shaky market reforms, Xi has not shied away from 
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tapping into nationalist rhetoric in order to strengthen his popular 
base, if not establish his own cult of personality (against his opponents). 
It is Osnos’s book, more than any other contemporary work, which 
provides a vivid picture of the vast impersonal forces, which are driving 
China’s growing territorial ambitions. The Age of Ambition is a strong 
reminder of how all politics is after all domestic. And this means that 
the trajectory of the South and East China Seas disputes will depend 
not only on inter-state balance of power configurations, but also, if not 
ultimately, on the domestic dynamics of China. 
We are now not exactly in a post-American world, but also not 
in an American-dominated era, as exemplified by China’s immense 
success in its assertion of territorial rights, as well as the establishment 
of alternative financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) that directly challenging the Bretton Woods 
System (BWS). This is why, as far as the East Asian order is concerned, 
we are perhaps heading into (if not already in) a “Pax Chimerica” era, 
where China is the preponderant economic power with growing 
military ambitions, while the United States is the preeminent naval 
power with an anemic economy.  
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